Wednesday, September 07, 2011

India's Pakistan appeasement policy - The China factor

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Continued from previous post relating to Pakistan appeasement policies by Mombatti brigade


By - Rudra Devacharya

The state of Pakistan, or at least those groups with the capacity to exercise any sort of central authority there, have lost confidence in their ability to preserve the identity and viability of Pakistan. Allah, Army and America were the pillars of the state, the guarantors of its survival through the previous century.  Today Allah and Army are fighting each other in a purer-on-pure conflict, and America is repeatedly sticking bamboos in the butt of the Pakistani state.  The present and potential ruling elite,  the empowered classes, are in a state of panic, reaching out desperately to all sorts of potential benefactors to guarantee the continuance of their empowered status. These include:

A) Maha-Islampasand Pakis: including many within ISI and Paki-army, who are still holding out in the hope that a pan-Ummah caliphate can be established and subsume present-day Pakistan. However, this group is grappling with twin calamities that have publicly exposed and undermined the fantastic and unsustainable nature of their goals; firstly, the exhaustion of fighting a ten-year war against drones, airstrikes, Afghan National Army (ANA) artillery and US special forces in the Northwest, and secondly, the crisis of credibility that has resulted from the decapitation strike against Bin Laden. Additionally, the increasing transformation of the Taliban into a Pashtun nationalist movement has undercut the legitimacy of the Maha-Islampasand Pakis' argument that being Purest of All is the solution to saving Pakistan.

B ) Chinipakis: the remaining portion of Paki-army and ISI, plus many elements of the "Pakistani anglicised elite" political class (such as Zardari) who are relying on the Chinese to save the day. They are the ones doing their damndest to mortgage the whole Pakistani state as the newest province of China. These, from the Indian point of view, may be the most dangerous... for reasons I will go into later. They are playing for a coup. a two-front war prosecuted by China and Pakistan against India, that will at once humiliate India, make America less relevant, and seize Kashmir in a move that will confer political legitimacy on the leadership claims of the Chinipaki group.

C) Pro-West Pakis: A very small number of Paki elite and Paki-army who are still pro-America, and cling to the hope that America will not leave the used condom shredded  in the garbage when it pulls out.

D)India tolerating Paki-liberals: An even smaller number of Paki elite who are, not pro-India, but at some level hope that India can sort things out and save Pakistan's skin (since the alternatives are all worse.) These are the Pak-tea-house type Paki liberals, who still hate India and Hindus, who still justify the creation of Pakistan, but all said and done feel more affinity for India than for China, Ummah or America.

E)Les petit-bourgeoise (small zamindars and lower middle class): A substantial number of Pakis who do NOT belong to the traditional echelons of power, i.e.Army/ISI Top-Brass or "anglicised political elite" class;  and who still hold out the hope that Pakistan as they once knew it can survive all this. Of all the categories this is the ONLY social class which actually has a vested interest in the survival and success of Pakistan as an *independent* nation state when all is said and done. They also consist of a les petit-bourgeoise (not-exactly-middle) class, ranging from shopkeepers to professionals and bureaucrats to smaller landowners who are not quite big enough to be "anglicised political elite" class" in the Zardari/Sharif mould.

What India is trying to accomplish is not "strategy", at least not a Pakistan strategy that is viable in the long term. What India is trying to do is to make the best of a bad situation and strengthen Section D by drawing Pakis of Section E to it. We are playing to gain time, and avoid a two-front war with Pakistan+China; not to destroy Pakistan or redeem Pakistan or reclaim POK or any of those grand designs. We are playing for time. That is all.

Section A is hopeless, and gives us entertainment value (IED blasts in Pakistan, Drone strikes in FATA) at best while  conducting terrorist attacks against Indian targets at worst.

Section B is very, very dangerous and their plans must be thwarted at ALL costs.

Section C is small enough to ignore entirely as a power bloc, but they may serve some limited purpose in advancing those few aspects of the Indian and American agendas that overlap. 

However, there is still some hope for Section E (along with Section D) to create the sort of temporary respite that might postpone the inevitable collapse of Pakistan for a few decades, while neither engendering an overwhelmingly dangerous situation on our borders nor swamping us with a massive humanitarian disaster just as we are beginning to make economic progress.

Section E, it must be noted, does have considerable presence in the paki-army... the sons of petit-bourgeoise Pakistanis who joined the armed forces, and who have lost confidence in the Elite-origin generals to run the country after seeing the disaster perpetrated over the last ten years. Some of these Section E Pakis may even be as high up as Brigadier and Major General. These guys, as well as the Section C (pro-US) Paki-army brass, are the intended audience of our dovishness that everyone from Dr. Manmohan Singh to B Raman to Bharat Karnad have been prescribing ("non-threatening posture" et al.) 

India is hoping that these Section E Paki-Army officers will become a pro-Indian (or at least, "not-anti-Indian") constituency, and forestall the designs of either Section A Maha-Islampasand elements of Paki-army, or Section B Chini-pasand elements of Paki-army.

Make no mistake, the Section D/E Pakis do not love India, they do not necessarily favour forgive-and-forget with India, they do not necessarily see the Indian position on Kashmir as justified; but they DO see that India/Kashmir is far from the greatest problem that Pakistan faces right now, and they will take India's help in strengthening their position to ward off those other, bigger problems. For now. Or so India hopes.

So. Why are Section B are the MOST dangerous Pakis?

Because it may be that China really wants a war. Preferably against India, with Pakistan as its ally.

China has been acting for the last several years, more aggressively than ever towards all its neighbours. Not ONE conciliatory move is made, but panga is taken with Japan, Korea, Taiwan, Vietnam, the Philippines AND India at every opportunity. Why?

Because China or at least, one very powerful faction in the Chinese govt, including the PLA, is convinced that China needs a war. 

Why does this faction think China needs a war?

It's like this. Throughout the 1990s, the Chinese accumulated what they thought was going to be their greatest source and permanent guarantee of wealth; forex reserves of Western currencies, and more importantly, debt owed by Western governments. Mainly the US government.

That component, the debt holdings, in the form of US treasury bonds and such, grew enormously through the 2000s, as the US borrowed money to finance its wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Meanwhile, Chinese export markets in the US also grew enormously in the 2000s until things reached a point where Chinese industries relied on US consumer markets to absorb a very large portion of their output.

When the 2008 financial crisis hit the Western world, especially the US, China's b@lls went into their mouth. It was a double-threat for China. On the one hand, all the US debt they held could become devalued in case of a depression. On the other hand, if US consumers stopped buying things, Chinese industries (which relied on US markets to absorb their output) would suffer. The resulting impact felt at home, by the Chinese economy, could have devastating consequences for a totalitarian regime.

What option does a country have when so much of its wealth is in the form of debt? It must monetize the debt. It must turn the debt into something real, as soon as possible, before that wealth (in the form of treasury bonds) becomes more and more devalued as a result of its debtor's financial troubles.

How can China monetize the debt it holds? Here are some ways.

1) It can demand that the US pay up. But the US doesn't have money. If the US prints money, then China's own holdings become further devalued (as it happened with QE2, which further aggravated the situation.)  Same for other Western countries, such as EU nations, which are also reeling financially.

2) It can print money and inject it into its own economy to increase domestic consumption. But this will inevitably lead to inflation, and cause civil unrest. Very bad idea, beyond narrow limits. Keeping tight control over money supply is much healthier from a totalitarian regime's point of view.

3) It can invest money into tinpot countries and gain goodwill. To some extent China has been doing this. But sooner or later, some returns have to be there no? So far, what returns have been generated by China's magnanimous projects in Sudan, Zimbabwe etc.? 

4) It can start a war. It can arm up, invest wholesale in defense R&D, in procurement of foreign weapons systems and manufacture of its own weapons systems. And it can use these weapons systems in the pursuit of other kinds of power i.e. geostrategic power. An additional benefit to this method of monetizing its debt is that it does not lead to civil unrest (at least as long as China can claim victory) but rather, to an upsurge in jingoistic nationalism that strengthens the position of an authoritarian government. 

There you have it. Starting a war is likely considered a good option, given the prevailing economic situation, by a powerful faction within the ruling establishment of China. The US and West do not care if China starts a war with India; it will damage two of their biggest competitors. And Pakistanis of Section B, above, very much want this to happen and want to participate on the Chinese side.

The ONLY thing that would make the Chinese hesitate in starting a war with India would be India's possession of a credible nuclear deterrent. And what has Bharat Karnad, Dr. Santhanam told us few months ago about India's thermonuclear bomb, between the lines, about that?

In summary, I am guessing that the GOI has understood all this. It understands that the danger of a two-front aggression by China and Pakistan is not just real but imminent. It has calculated that we cannot win, and that we cannot count on external help to win. It may have calculated (ref: Dr. Santhanam) that we do not even have a credible nuclear deterrent to prevent this from happening.

So in a sense, just as we are the only hope for Pakis of Sections D and E, Pakis of Sections D and E are our only hope to avert disaster. That's why we're seeing the appeasement policies.

Discerning the intentions of Mombatti Brigade

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By - Dikgaj


Posting this few hours after today's terrorist attack on Delhi-High-court. How true are the intentions of the candle-lighting brigade of India, which comes out after every terrorist attack, to light candles and profess the "aman-ki-asha" type projects? How true are the intentions of those who wish for peace with Pakistan, ignoring all the imminent threats posed to India in general and Hindus/Sikhs/Buddhists of India in particular, owing the rabid hatred of pakistanis towards latter? It seems that everyone from Prime-Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh to ex RAW chief Sri. Bahukutumbi Raman, to strategic analysts and thinkers like Sri. Bharat Karnad have been towing the lines of "aman ki asha" type projects. 

The information coming out from various sources seems to be confounding and confusing, given the general understanding in Indian community that a stable and prosperous Pakistan is not in India's interest, but neither is a failed and Talibanized Pakistan. The only pakistan that is in India's interest is one which is in constant struggle within itself. When this is known, why the deliberate misinformative posturing by Government of India and strategic and intelligence community?

First danger is that of "tagging". If a person is officially in a position where he is known to be getting information/seeking information/ and analyzing them for potential policy decisions - then he may attract deliberate misinformation, or cleverly entwined misinformation within correct ones. Of course superior intelligences would have thought of all of this and keep multiple sources for cross-checks. But it is still possible to release informations from centralized disemination mechanisms combined with tactical visible ground movements - which will give a coordinated "disinformation".

Second danger is that there can be a saturation of false/semi-false/true information all mixed up together - so that a time comes when the analyst no longer sees value in any of them. This is a process of conscious rejection and wipe-out of what is seen as old ideas which are no longer working - without perhaps being aware that some of this rejection could the result of an earlier failure to recognize the real processes.

Over and above all this, perhaps the larger issue is whether an analyst also consciously analyzes himself. Is he aware or constantly trying also to explore the basis of his own ideologies - value-systems - and axiomatic proclivities, and their changes over time and experience? If he had really made that "stereotyping" Hindutvavaadi comment - did he stop and think as to what internal or subconscious processes brought out that reaction in him? 

Trying to be "neutral" is a sadly funny business - because it forces one to be constantly over attentive to the two extremes one is trying to be neutral - relative to. Thus the "purely" neutral person is in constant and unsure undefined "middle ground", and perhaps much much more aware of "extremes" than those he clubs as extremists.

Because of lack of clear cut ideological or value-system commitments that can order given situations or positions, over-anxious to be "neutral" persons in constant touch or with a heightened awareness of "extremes" are always at the risk of at one point of time, identifying with one of these extremes as a means of ideological certainty.

I think it is most important to encourage what we call Mombatti brigade. There is no point in badmouthing and lambasting the Paki aam-Janta. People are not targets of criticism - it is what they do, their ideological apparent drives, as matching with actions [people run multiple identity forgeries - they may represent themselves as one of many according to opportunity and hopes for gains - not necessarily of silver but also of esteem and power] - which are targets of criticism. Perhaps my sympathy for Mombatti-brigade shows in this too - because I have always stood for a future of absorption of both the people and the land into India.

A huge test of proper Mombatti-ism comes up when anyone expressing overwhelming softness for parts of Pak - people/culture/gov/society whatever, is asked his feelings about whether he would be ready to accept inclusion of Pakistani people and territory into an enlarged future India. Inevitably - the greatest love for Pakis in the form of Mombatti-ism mostly appears to accompany an intense anguish at even the thought of incorporating these dearly beloved people and lands into close societal proximity.

Not wanting Pakis in our midst - while becoming "soft" on them as a rashtra/people - is the height of self-deluding deception. But then again, such turns of ideological attitudes over a life time, and given high-ranks and exposure to "information" - should be studied. I would see it as almost inevitable and a good illustration as to how people in position could have gone towards greater accommodation with hostile ideologies in our history - while having fought such ideologies for a major part of their lives. This is no accusation against B.Raman ji - but for me a curious window into a very real intellectual process. A very crucial process needing observation and studying. 

Thursday, August 25, 2011

Rajput-Maratha relations of 18th century - Pointers towards future course of Republic of India

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Rajput-Maratha relations are very interesting. By 16tth-17th century, Rajputs had been intricately networked with Mughals. The Islamic rebellion of 1580s was quelled by Akbar using rajputs. They were linked to Mughals and their other networks by means of marital alliances as well. Thus, for all practical purposes, 18th century Rajputs were extensions of Mughals (so some extent, there are notable exceptions, but that will be out of scope here). For Marathas who were new to this politics of north, there were too many undercurrents which they took time to understand. 

Bajirao-1 had kept amicable relations with Rajputana states by far and large. After his death, the empire became so heavily entangled in politics of North and South (Kaveri basin and south of Krishna-Tungabhadra river) that it was very hectic for nanasaheb to maintain his personal presence everywhere. Furthermore, unlike his father, he was not a soldier by character. He was an armchair politician of excellent calibre. 

The questions asked frequently by those interested in socio-politico-economic history of 18t century India are that -

1. What were the reasons for Marathas to get entangled in politics of Rajasthan? 

2. Could we attribute it to the lack of a national identity? Or was it payback time for all the harm that rajputs did in Maharashtra under the employ of the mughals?

As far as I understand, cash was major reason for this entanglement. The trade routes of Indian ocean were controlled by Europeans, by the time Mughals were defeated and marathas in Pune started framing India's policies. Shivaji began to raise navy after gap of about 650 years. Meanwhile, the ship-building tradition had almost vanished amongst "hindus". Along with it vanished the tradition of naval warfare. 

Mughals and Islamic kings were from central Asia and gave no importance to navy and neglected the traditional hold of India (and Indian powers) on Indian ocean for 5 centuries (From early 1100s to 1650s). In those 650 years, the necessity of Europe to reach out to India grew dire and in that process they developed better tools to reach India some way or the another. Most important of those tools were better ships loaded with better guns.

Marathas had to reinvent the wheel of Ship-building and naval warfare completely. While they were the ones who started meddling with european powers, Maratha navy was essentially a brown-water navy (which is still the case in modern republic of India, who is successor of maratha India). With this navy they did conquer bases like Andaman and other islands, they could not encourage Indic mercantile ventures to go out and trade with rest of the world under the aegis and protection of Maratha navy (something which even modern Indian state isn't doing much). 

There are various reasons for this, one of them being by that time Hinduism had acquired many negative self-flagellant attributes, one of them being "Sindhu-Bandi" (First of the seven legendary "prohibitions" on Hindus). Sindhu-Bandi prohibited Hindus from crossing Indus river and Indian ocean. The Vaishya-class of India was more of less following this norm.

The process which "generates surplus wealth" is trade. One who controls trade-routes, has access to surplus resources which he can use at his disposal. While agriculture and taxation also contribute towards "sustenance", they cannot create impetus for growth. 

The predecessors of Maratha-India that is Mughal-India and Sultanate-India had lost this control. Hence policy makers of Maratha India were perpetually cash-strapped, even when the taxation of the territories ruled by them was quite efficient. They were not much indulgent rulers, nor did they spend money on private or public construction projects, except religious revival (all temples destroyed by muslims were rebuilt in Maratha-India). 

Shivaji had abolished the mansabdari system and started paying fixed salary to all his soldiers and employees with a calibrated pay-scale. However, when Aurangzeb invaded deccan, he started luring the deccan satraps by offering them Mansabs and jaagirs (fiefdoms). To prevent this attrition of men, the third Maratha king (Rajaram) abolished the reform brought in by his father (Shivaji) and implemented by his elder brother (Sambhaji) in spite of adverse conditions and started offering Jaagirs to Maratha chiefs. 

He decentralized Maratha resistance (which is why they could outfight Mughals for 27 years and emerge victorious thereafter). This decentralization implied Maratha chiefs could win territories from Mughal occupied India and could extract the chauth (25% revenue) to sustain themselves. They would not receive any assistance from Maratha state, except authorization.

This school of thought sustained after Mughals died out and marathas retook India. War and expansion require revenues. With no access to trade and revenue generated therein, the options left in hand was agriculture, taxation or loot. The output of war-ravaged country in form of taxation and agriculture is very less (it takes time for farmers to come back and confidently till their lands).

Rajputs had allied themselves with Mughals since days of Akbar. many of the Rajput kings were intimately linked with Mughals (mother of Aurangzeb was a Rajput princess, if I remember correctly). Hence the wealth was intact in Rajputana. While Rajputs showed no tendency to regroup and expand outside Rajputana (akin to Marathas), they were sitting on pool of wealth, part of which had escaped Mughal retribution for at least 100 years prior to expansion of Marathas. Furthermore, Marwadi people had knack of trading and accumulating wealth (in fact, Peshwas encouraged Marwadis to migrate to Maharashtra and start their ventures there). This Marwad region too is in Rajputana.

Marathas which emerged out victorious, belonged to the school of Rajaram and not Shivaji and Sambhaji. Hindu society was not yet ready to venture out to trade. To do so, they had to depend on Europeans and Indians had lost the technology to build ships which could compete and outmatch europeans due to negligence of 600 years. These cash-strapped expanding Hindus needed money to fuel their expansion. Territory controlled by Rajputs had that money stored in their coffers. Marathas had no qualms in looting or asking for 25% chauth, in fact it was righteous thing to do as that would fund their expansion and temple-rebuilding ventures. 

Furthermore, Rajputs were divided, hence comparatively easier to cherry-pick. They belonged to "Hindu" side (and hence kafir side) of Mughal network, so attacking them won't provoke Indian "Ummah" to give a clarion call for Abdali-like Jihad again (which resulted in Panipat), hence attacking Rajput was more "politically convenient". There are many other factors (like Shinde-Holkar-Peshwa triangle which emerged after 1745, entanglement of Marathas in politics of Ganga-valley and few more). All these factors resulted in Maratha-Rajput relations. Similar other region was Bengal, something similar happened there from 1740 to 1751.

The Indian national identity was very much present, hence we cannot attribute the infighting of Indians and Hindus to lack of national identity. There are numerous letters from period of Shivaji to later Peshwas (until 1802) where "India for Indians" sentiment is spoken of and acted upon time and again. Panipat campaign is pinnacle of this sentiment. So we cannot attribute it to "lack of national identity" in Marathas. Marathas, after 1715, were "India", just like from Samudragupta onwards, Guptas were "India".

Nor can it be attributed to vengeance. Most Maratha-clans claim their Rajput ancestory (Shivaji came from Sisodiya clan). Marathas did not even avenge the Jaipur Massacre of 1748 by Madho Singh, when they were at their peak, forget the Mughal invasion of Raja Jaisingh century earlier in 1660s. 

Marathas had not yet consolidated Ganga-plains to profit from agricultural revenue. They could not profit from trade revenues for reasons mentioned above. Taxation can do only so much. They were in process of consolidating and eventually controlling two agriculturally most productive regions of India (Ganga Valley and Punjab). For doing so, they needed to keep armies. For that they needed cash. and hence whenever they needed cash, they turned towards Rajputana.

Did Marathas have choice of allying with Jats, Rajputs, Sikhs against Muslims? Was it really a "Hindu Vs Muslim" conflict? No, IMHO. It was more of "Dharma Vs. Islam" conflict.  This again does not imply that all actions of marathas were Dharmiks. But what they were aiming for, were fighting and dying for since the oath of 14-year old Shivaji in 1645, was idea of Dharmik India ruled by Indians (Hindavi Swarajya and Surajya). 

History is for learning. The mistakes of Marathas are known to everyone. Why did they commit them? What were the reasons which forced them to choose this style of governance? Few of those reasons are elucidated above. Modern republic of India will be facing exactly similar choices as Maratha India in near future. They have committed few mistakes akin to Marathas, without learning from them. But the "Panipat" of modern ROI is yet to happen, they moves have started. 

Modern Abdali (taliban) is mustering armies in Northwest and indigenous najibs and Shujas (radical islamist groups of Indian origin) and Holkars (Hindu leaders and parties like Digvijay Singh and Congress respectively) have begun showing their cards and playing their moves. If they want stable and peaceful India, ROI must embrace Maratha legacy and not shun and shy away from it. Whether ROI likes it or not, after Maratha-India, they are the "Successor iteration" of Hindu-India. They should draw their ideological inspiration and legacy of power from Marathas and not from British and Mughals.

The vision of "Dharma" or the "End game" was clear in Maratha minds.. Is it clear in the minds of their current successor? What is the reason of existence of Republic of India? Has ROI defined and answered this critical question yet?

Saturday, August 20, 2011

सिंहासन खाली करो - Dynasty!! vacate the throne, people approaching

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सदियों की ठंढी, बुझी राख सुगबुगा उठी,
मिट्टी सोने का ताज पहन इठलाती है;
दो राह, समय के रथ का घर्घर-नाद सुनो,
सिंहासन खाली करो कि जनता आती है।
  
जनता? हां,मिट्टी की अबोध मूरतें वही,
जाड़े-पाले की कसक सदा सहनेवाली,
जब अंग-अंग में लगे सांप हो चूस रहे
तब भी न कभी मुंह खोल दर्द कहनेवाली।

जनता? हां, लंबी-बडी जीभ की वही कसम,
"जनता,सचमुच ही, बडी वेदना सहती है।"
"सो ठीक, मगर, आखिर इस पर जनमत क्या है?"
'है प्रश्न गूढ़ जनता इस पर क्या कहती है?"

मानो, जनता ही फूल जिसे अहसास नहीं,
जब चाहो तभी उतार सजा लो दोनों में;
अथवा कोई दुधमुंही जिसे बहलाने के
जन्तर-मन्तर सीमित हों चार खिलौनों में।

लेकिन होता भूडोल, बवंडर उठते हैं,
जनता जब कोपाकुल हो भृकुटि चढाती है;
दो राह, समय के रथ का घर्घर-नाद सुनो,
सिंहासन खाली करो कि जनता आती है।

हुंकारों से महलों की नींव उखड़ जाती,
सांसों के बल से ताज हवा में उड़ता है,
जनता की रोके राह,समय में ताव कहां?
वह जिधर चाहती,काल उधर ही मुड़ता है।

अब्दों, शताब्दियों, सहस्त्राब्द का अंधकार
बीता; गवाक्ष अंबर के दहके जाते हैं;
यह और नहीं कोई,जनता के स्वप्न अजय
चीरते तिमिर का वक्ष उमड़ते जाते हैं।

सब से विराट जनतंत्र जगत का आ पहुंचा,
तैंतीस कोटि-हित सिंहासन तैयार करो
अभिषेक आज राजा का नहीं,प्रजा का है,
तैंतीस कोटि जनता के सिर पर मुकुट धरो।

आरती लिये तू किसे ढूंढता है मूरख,
मन्दिरों, राजप्रासादों में, तहखानों में?
देवता कहीं सड़कों पर गिट्टी तोड़ रहे,
देवता मिलेंगे खेतों में, खलिहानों में।

फावड़े और हल राजदण्ड बनने को हैं,
धूसरता सोने से श्रृंगार सजाती है;
दो राह,समय के रथ का घर्घर-नाद सुनो,
सिंहासन खाली करो कि जनता आती है।

Poet - Ramdhari Singh "Dinkar"

Thursday, July 14, 2011

Kshama Dayaa Taap Tyaag - A moving poem by Ramdhaari Singh "Dinkar"

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क्षमा, दया , ताप , त्याग , मनोबल सबका लिया सहारा 
पर नर व्याघ सुयोधन तुमसे कहो कहाँ कब हारा? 
क्षमाशील हो रिपु समक्ष तुम हुए विनीत जितना ही 
दुष्ट कौरवों ने तुमको कायर समझा उतना ही 

अत्याचार सहन करने का कुफल यही होता है 
पौरुष का आतंक मनुज कोमल होकर खोता है 
क्षमा शोभती उस भुजंग को जिसके पास गरल है 
उसका क्या जो दंतहीन विषरहित विनीत सरल है 

तीन दिवस तक पंथ मांगते रघुपति सिन्धु किनारे
बैठे पढते रहे छंद अनुनय के प्यारे प्यारे 
उत्तर में जब एक नाद भी उठा नहीं सागर से 
उठी अधीर धधक पौरुष की आग राम के शर से 

सिन्धु देह धर त्राहि-त्राहि करता आ गिरा शरण में 
चरण पूज दासता ग्रहण की बंधा मूढ़ बंधन में 
सच पूछो तो शर में ही बस्ती है दीप्ति विनय की 
संधिवचन संपूज्य उसीका जिसमे शक्ति विजय की 

सहनशीलता, क्षमा, दया को तभी पूजता जग है 
बल का दर्प चमकता उसके पीछे जब जगमग है 

-रामधारी सिंह "दिनकर" 


Mercy, resolve, tact, tolerance you've tried everything and some
But o my king of men when did Suyodhan succumb?
The more forgiving you were In your humane compassion
The more these rouge Kauravas pegged you as cowardly ashen

This is the consequence Of tolerating atrocities
The awe of machismo is lost When one's gentle n kindly
Forgiveness is becoming of The serpent that's got venom
None cares for the toothless, Poisonless, kind, gentle one

For three days Lord Raam kept Asking the ocean for a passage
Sitting there he petitioned Using the sweetest words to engage
When in response there was Not a whisper from the sea
A raging fire of endeavor Rose from Raam's body


The ocean took human-form 'N supplicated to Raam
Touched his feet, was subservient A slave he had become
Truth be told, it's in the quiver That lies the gleam of modesty
Only his peace-talk is reputable Who is capable of victory

Tolerance, forgiveness and clemency Are respected by the world
Only when the glow of strength From behind it is unfurled

Poet - Ramdhaari Singh "Dinkar"